SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 susceptibility and infectiousness of children and adults deduced from investigations of childcare centre outbreaks, Germany, 2021 by Loenenbach, Anna et al.
1www.eurosurveillance.org
Rapid communication
SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 susceptibility and 
infectiousness of children and adults deduced from 
investigations of childcare centre outbreaks, Germany, 
2021
Anna Loenenbach1,2, Inessa Markus1,2, Ann-Sophie Lehfeld1, Matthias an der Heiden¹, Walter Haas¹, Maya Kiegele3,4, André 
Ponzi3,4, Barbara Unger-Goldinger⁴, Cornelius Weidenauer⁴, Helen Schlosser⁴, Alexander Beile4, Udo Buchholz¹
1. Department for Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Robert Koch-Institute, Berlin, Germany
2. These authors contributed equally to this article and share first authorship
3. Federal Office of Administration, Cologne, Germany
4. Local Health Authority Bergstraße/Hesse, Heppenheim, Germany
Correspondence: Anna Loenenbach (loenenbacha@rki.de)
Citation style for this article: 
Loenenbach Anna, Markus Inessa, Lehfeld Ann-Sophie, an der Heiden Matthias, Haas Walter, Kiegele Maya, Ponzi André, Unger-Goldinger Barbara, Weidenauer 
Cornelius, Schlosser Helen, Beile Alexander, Buchholz Udo. SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 susceptibility and infectiousness of children and adults deduced from 
investigations of childcare centre outbreaks, Germany, 2021. Euro Surveill. 2021;26(21):pii=2100433. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2021.26.21.2100433
Article submitted on 03 May 2021 / accepted on 26 May 2021 / published on 27 May 2021
We investigated three SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 
childcare centre and related household outbreaks. 
Despite group cohorting, cases occurred in almost all 
groups, i.e. also among persons without close contact. 
Children’s secondary attack rates (SAR) were similar to 
adults (childcare centres: 23% vs 30%; p = 0.15; house-
holds: 32% vs 39%; p = 0.27); child- and adult-induced 
household outbreaks also led to similar SAR. With the 
advent of B.1.1.7, susceptibility and infectiousness of 
children and adults seem to converge. Public health 
measures should be revisited accordingly.
In December 2020, the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) ‘variant of con-
cern’ (VOC) B.1.1.7 (N501Y.V1) began to circulate in 
Germany. As at 3 March 2021, approximately 40% of 
all randomly selected swabs of all coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19) cases tested positive for the B.1.1.7 variant 
[1]. While several studies have presented evidence for 
the increased transmissibility of B.1.1.7 [2-4] there is 
limited evidence on the susceptibility and infectious-
ness of children, particularly for those of preschool age 
[5,6]. Here we describe the investigation of three child-
care centre outbreaks caused by the B.1.1.7 variant and 
our assessment of secondary attack rates (SAR) within 
the centres and associated households.
Outbreaks in childcare centres and 
investigations conducted
In January–February 2021, three B.1.1.7 variant child-
care centre outbreaks occurred almost simultaneously 
in a district of one local health authority (LHA) in the 
State of Hesse. Together with the related household 
situations these outbreaks gave us the opportunity to 
assess: (i) if high-risk contact definitions (within 1.5 
m distance for at least 15 min) still hold; (ii) if there 
are indications of increased susceptibility of pre-
school children in comparison to adults; and (iii) the 
infectiousness of preschool children, in comparison to 
adults in household settings.
A joint outbreak investigation team from the LHA and 
the Robert Koch Institute (RKI, national public health 
institute) in Berlin, investigated the outbreaks and col-
lected information regarding structural, organisational 
and infection control measures in the facilities. The 
childcare centres cared for between 26 and 49 children, 
aged from 1 to 6 years. Two to five staff took care of the 
children, cohorted in two to four groups. All childcare 
centres had an additional daycare group for children up 
to 3 years, which was structurally separated within the 
buildings.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, all three child-
care centres had the following hygiene and infection 
control measures in place: (i) cohort grouping with a 
reduced number of children and designated staff, and 
access to separate bathroom areas, (ii) playing outside 
only within same groups in assigned playground areas, 
(iii) staff wearing masks at least outside of the group 
rooms, (iv) parents not allowed to enter the building 
and mandatory mask-wearing during children’s drop off 
and pick up, and (v) conducting meetings digitally with 
staff and/or parents, if possible.
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Secondary attack rates in childcare centres
Following the outbreaks’ detection, the outbreak 
investigation team visited the facilities and conducted 
interviews with childcare centres’ management and 
primary and/or first secondary cases. Comprehensive 
testing for SARS-CoV-2 was offered to all children and 
personnel at the facilities. All contact persons were 
followed up daily for symptoms via telephone calls by 
public health workers at the LHA. Any person becom-
ing symptomatic was tested by PCR. We considered the 
outbreak as over, when over a time period of 14 days 
no new cases occurred. Those with a positive PCR test 
within this time frame were considered as secondary 
cases. Centre contact persons testing negative or in 
the absence of a test (n = 13, 3 and 15, in childcare cen-
tres 1, 2 and 3, respectively) and without symptoms, 
were counted as non-cases. We defined as a close con-
tact person anyone with an encounter to the primary 
case (PC) of ≥ 15 min within a distance of < 1.5 m. All 
other persons in the childcare centres were defined as 
non-close contacts.
The overall SAR in the three childcare centres were 
37% (95% confidence interval (CI): 26–49), 27% (95% 
CI: 16–42) and 17% (95% CI: 9–28) (Table 1). In all 
three outbreaks the likely PCs were adults. None of 
them reported respiratory symptoms as the initial 
symptoms at illness onset, but rather general, unspe-
cific symptoms, such as fatigue, headache, back pain 
or exhaustion. In all three childcare centres, 80% to 
88% of secondary cases occurred within an interval of 
7 days (Table 1).
Eleven of all twelve cohorted groups had secondary 
cases. SAR for close contact persons were 53% (95% 
CI: 30–75), 33% (95% CI: 12–65) and 22% (95% CI: 
12–37), and among non-close contacts 32% (95% CI: 
21–45), 26% (95% CI: 14–42) and 6% (95% CI: 1–26). 
SAR for children were 31% (95% CI: 20–45), 27% (95% 
CI: 14–46) and 17% (95% CI: 8–32), and among adults 
53% (95% CI: 32–73), 28% (95% CI: 12–51) and 17% 
(95% CI: 7–37) (Table 1).
Secondary attack rates in households
Households were not tested systematically. However, 
we offered contact persons a PCR test shortly after the 
PC tested positive. Those who tested positive within 
the two-week quarantine were counted as cases. We 
contacted households to monitor symptom onset dates 
and tested symptomatic persons. Household con-
tact persons testing negative or, in the absence of a 
test (19/92; 21%), without symptoms, were counted 
as non-cases. After exclusion of single person house-
holds (n = 2) and households with another possible 
PC (n = 6), we included 38 households with 92 contact 
persons.
Pooled household SAR was 37% (95% CI: 28–47; Table 
2). If the household contact person was a child (32%; 
95% CI: 18–51), SAR was lower but not significantly dif-
ferent compared with adult household contact persons 
(39%; 95% CI: 28–51). SAR in households were higher 
when the PC was a child (39%; 95% CI: 28–52) vs adult 
PC (33%; 95% CI: 20–50), although this difference was 
not statistically significant.
Table 1
Secondary attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant infections in sub-groups, by type of contact and by age in three 
childcare centre outbreaks, Hesse, Germany, January–February 2021
Childcare centre 1 Childcare centre 2 Childcare centre 3
n/N SAR (%) 95% CI n/N SAR (%) 95% CI n/N SAR (%) 95% CI
Overall SAR 25/68 37 26–49 12/44 27 16–42 10/59 17 9–28
7 days clusteringa 22/25 88 70–96 10/12 83 55–95 8/10 80 49–94
Group
Group 1 (with PC) 8/15 53 30–75 3/9 33 12–65 6/18 33 16–56
Group 2 7/11 64 35–85 6/15 40 20–64 3/20 15 5–36
Group 3 2/9 22 6–55 1/7 14 3–51 NA – –
Group 4 5/16 31 14–56 NA – – NA – –
Daycare 2/12 17 5–45 0/7 0 0–35 1/15 7 1–30
Staff 1/5 20 4–62 2/6 33 10–70 0/6 0 0–39
Type of contact
Close contact 8/15 53 30–75 3/9 33 12–65 9/41 22 12–37
Non-close contact 17/53 32 21–45 9/35 26 14–42 1/18 6 1–26
Age category
Children 15/49 31 20–45 7/26 27 14–46 6/36 17 8–32
Adults 10/19 53 32–73 5/18 28 12–51 4/23 17 7–37
CI: confidence interval; n: number; N: total number; NA: not applicable; PC: primary case; SAR: secondary attack rates; SARS-CoV-2: severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
a Clustering of secondary cases within an interval of 7 days. For asymptomatic persons (childcare centre 1: n = 7; childcare centre 2: n = 5; 
childcare centre 3: n = 2) the day of testing was assigned.
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Discussion
These simultaneously occurring outbreaks in childcare 
facilities provided an opportunity to revisit definitions 
of ‘closeness’. For pre-VOC SARS-CoV-2 strains, close 
(high-risk) contacts were associated with a SAR of 5% 
[7] to 13% [8], while non-close (or low-risk) contacts 
were associated with a SAR of 0% [7] to 3% [8]. At least 
in the childcare centre 1 and 2 outbreaks described 
here, contact persons not fulfilling the existing defi-
nition of a ‘close contact’ had a substantially higher 
SAR than previously reported. Moreover, in all three 
outbreaks, we documented case-clustering within 
approximately 1 week, which is compatible with a one- 
or two-day exposure for the entire childcare centre. 
Remarkably, transmission occurred in similar propor-
tions to children and adults alike. In addition, trans-
mission affected 11 of 12 groups, including the rather 
separated daycare groups.
During our investigation, we gained a good overview 
of attitudes and practices of educators and the adher-
ence to hygiene and infection control measures in the 
three childcare centres. These insights enabled us to 
classify children in the two groups of childcare centre 
3 as close contacts since we learned during the vis-
its that they took their meals in the same room even 
though separated by a bookshelf and within 1.5 m dis-
tance. By visiting each centre, we observed that the 
space available and type of ventilation differed, which 
may have facilitated airborne transmission to different 
degrees, resulting in varied SAR between the centres; 
rooms in childcare centre 1 were small with low ceil-
ings, childcare centre 2 had a ventilation system and 
the two groups in childcare centre 3 were spread out 
over two floors. In addition, childcare centre 3 was 
closed entirely faster than the other centres which 
might further explain its smaller outbreak size.
Despite the noteworthy variability of SAR between the 
facilities we also analysed susceptibility to the B.1.1.7 
variant by broad age categories. With the exception of 
the childcare centre 1 outbreak, SAR were similar among 
children and adults within the centres. Reinforcing 
this point, they were also similar in the household 
outbreaks. This seems to imply a similar susceptibil-
ity of adults and children and marks a change to the 
time before the circulation of the B.1.7.7 variant, when 
children were associated with lower susceptibility com-
pared with adults [9-11]. Further, the point estimates of 
household SAR of both children (32%; 95% CI: 18–51) 
and adults (39%; 95% CI: 28–51) were higher than 
those calculated for the pre-B.1.7.7 variant period in the 
meta-analysis by Madewell et al. (17%; 95% CI: 12–22 
and 28%; 95% CI: 20–37, respectively) [11], which sug-
gests an overall increase in transmissibility. However, 
we must concede that there is a high variability among 
the studies included and the CIs after meta-analysis 
overlap with the ones reported here.
Evidence from international studies from outbreak or 
household investigations involving the SARS-CoV-2 
B.1.1.7 variant is limited. Data from the United Kingdom 
on SAR among B.1.1.7 close contacts (definition for 
close contacts being similar to the definition used in 
this study) stratified by 10-year age groups, indicate 
a similar relative increase among most age groups [5]. 
However, reported SARs among 0–9-year-olds are still 
lower compared with adults (9% vs ca 20%).
Important questions of our investigation were, if chil-
dren – after having been infected in childcare facilities 
– cause further infections in their household, and if 
so, to what extent children infect adults in their house-
holds. The above mentioned meta-analysis of pre-VOC 
studies found a (non-significantly) lower SAR when 
children aged < 18 years were the PC (7.9%; 95% CI: 1.7–
16.8) compared with SAR when adults were the house-
hold PC (15.2%; 95% CI: 6.2–27.4) [11]. In our study, 
we found SAR of 39% (95% CI: 28–52) for preschool 
child PCs and 33% (95% CI: 20–50) for adult PCs. A 
Danish study analysed administrative data compris-
ing the full population [6]. SAR in households with a 
case infected by SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant was found 
to be 38% compared to 27% in households with cases 
infected by other variants. A display by age groups 
Table 2
Secondary household attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 variant infections among household contacts of primary cases 
from three childcare centre outbreaks, Hesse, January–February 2021
Household situation n/N SAR in % 95% CI RR 95% CI
All 34/92 37 28–47 NA NA
Household CP is a child 9/28 32 18–51 0.82 0.44–1.52
Household CP is an adult 25/64 39 28–51 Ref
PC is a child (n = 22) 23/59 39 28–52 1.17 0.66–2.09
Household CP is a child 4/15 27 11–52 NA NA
Household CP is an adult 19/44 43 30–58 NA NA
PC is an adult (n = 16) 11/33 33 20–50 Ref
Household CP is a child 5/13 38 18–64 NA NA
Household CP is an adult 6/20 30 15–52 NA NA
CI: confidence interval; CP: contact person; n: number; N: total number; NA: not applicable; PC: primary case; Ref: reference; RR: relative risk; 
SAR: secondary attack rates; SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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showed a U-shaped curve for both B.1.1.7 susceptibility 
and infectiousness, shifted upwards from non-B.1.1.7 
variants, with a low SAR for teenagers, and compara-
ble SAR values for 0–4 and 5–9 year-old children and 
adults. Thus, their results compared well with ours.
We acknowledge the following limitations: first, all 
imperfections associated with observational data 
apply to our study, such as non-randomisation of child-
care facilities, PCs, exposed persons and measures 
taken. Second, because not everyone was tested, we 
may have underestimated the actual SAR. However, 
symptom monitoring during quarantine was in place 
and would have led to immediate testing, thus limiting 
the underestimation. Third, in households, asympto-
matic persons may be the true PCs, and cases outside 
the family may have infected a family member indepen-
dently from the assumed household’s PC. Even if these 
possibilities may be true in individual households, it is 
unlikely to distort the overall picture.
Conclusion
In summary, our investigation supports the notion of 
an increased transmissibility of the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 
variant. In addition, the data presented suggest that 
both susceptibility and infectiousness of children 
aged between 1 to 6 years are substantially higher 
compared with the pre-VOC period, and may be con-
verging to those among adults. To prevent individual 
childcare facility outbreaks, or at least limit outbreak 
size, measures in place need to be revisited, including 
non-pharmaceutical measures. Early closure should be 
considered when cases are occurring, and vaccination 
of staff should be promoted.
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